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ALTERNATIVE CARETAKING AND FAMILY AUTONOMY:
SOME THOUGHTS IN RESPONSE TO DOROTHY ROBERTS
KATHARINE K. BAKER*
INTRODUCTION
Dorothy Roberts's analysis of the ways in which current kinship
foster care arrangements highlight the need for more state support of
caregiving and perversely sever familial bonds in the African
American community raises important issues for those concerned
about caregiving and the legal treatment of families.' In this short
response, I will address two of those issues. First, I argue that it is
important to understand how state support for caregiving can reify
primary caretaker norms and undermine alternative care arrange-
ments that have proven so valuable in communities of color. Second,
I suggest that attempts to strengthen family ties must articulate a
theory for family autonomy that dispenses with current doctrinal
rules linking autonomy to financial independence and parental
prerogative.
I. ALTERNATIVE CARETAKING
Roberts describes how financial exigency often compels parents
to relinquish their parental rights so that a kinship care provider can
collect the greater monthly payments and allocation of services
provided to foster parents.2 She implies that if the state did a better
job of supporting caretaking, such alternative care arrangements
would not be necessary and parents would not have to relinquish
control of their children simply because they do not have adequate
resources.3 This raises an important question, though. Is the problem
that parents have to relinquish parental control to grandparents,
* Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology.
1. See Dorothy Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for Children, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1619 (2001).
2. See id. at 1621, 1627, 1630.
3. See id. at 1621, 1640.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
aunts, and sisters (i.e., kinship care providers) or is the problem that
parents have to relinquish control to the state? As the system is
structured now, parents in need of more assistance must do both, but
it is important to figure out where the problem lies. However
appealing it may be to say that no parent should ever have to
relinquish parental control for purely financial reasons, the fact is that
many if not most parents do precisely that. Whether they are
relinquishing control to daycare providers or nannies or
grandmothers, parents who enlist others in helping them raise their
children allow others to assert significant influence over their
children. Parents with money may do this because they actually
prefer to share parental responsibilities in this way (because such
sharing allows them to earn more money or spend more time doing
something else), but parents without much money may have
comparable needs and desires.
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program,
which Roberts indicates served women of color better because it did
not lead to such a reliance on kinship foster care,4 was founded on the
premise that mothers should not have to share parental
responsibilities.' The purpose behind the original AFDC program
was to allow women who were not supported by men to stay home to
take care of their children because it was assumed that a mother-as-
primary-caretaker norm, if not mother-as-only-caretaker norm, was
preferable.6 Sharing parental responsibilities was something one was
forced by circumstance to do, not something one might do by choice.
The government stepped in to alleviate whatever hardship caused
these single mothers to have to share.
There are now solid reasons to question the ideology behind the
original welfare grants, and they are reasons that have nothing to do
with the political rhetoric that ended AFDC or engendered the
current structure of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
4. See id. at 1626-27.
5. "Home life is the highest and finest product of civilization.... Parents of good
character suffering from temporary misfortune, and above all deserving mothers fairly well able
to work but deprived of the support of the normal breadwinner, should be given such aid as may
be necessary to enable them to maintain suitable homes for the rearing of their children."
ruLt UDINU O Jr .u.,rrntttNr.E ON flra CARE OF ErPnLDET I... CHILDRENa , S.. Doc. O.
60-721, at 5-6 (1909).
6. "The purpose of legislation for aid to dependent children has been to ... enable the
mother to stay at home and devote herself to housekeeping and the care of her children ......
COMM. ON ECON. SEC., SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA: THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT As SUMMARIZED FROM STAFF REPORTS TO THE COMMITrEE ON
ECONOMIC SECURITY 233 (1937).
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("TANF").7 The problem with "welfare as we knew it" was not so
much that it allowed women to stay on welfare so that they would not
have to work; it was that it reinforced the notion that childcare was an
exclusively nuclear family responsibility. An indirect benefit of the
move to TANF is that it at least gets more people thinking about
ways to integrate caretaking with work and other activities. Kinship
care was less necessary under the AFDC regime, but its absence may
have reflected an inadequate vision of the realm of appropriate
caretaking arrangements.
There are important advantages to kinship care arrangements.
They provide both children and mothers with an expanded
understanding of family and caregiving. There is ample evidence that
children raised in more collective environments, whether it be an
Israeli kibbutz,8 an American daycare center,9 or an extended family,
do not suffer in their emotional, moral, or physical development.
Roberts herself notes that kinship foster care arrangements help
preserve family, community, and cultural ties. Various scholars from
a variety of disciplines suggest that children who are isolated in the
home tend to be overly invested in their caretakers and insufficiently
invested in collectives.'0 Children may benefit from systems that
encourage more collective responsibility for childcare. Such systems
allow children to experience a variety of caregivers and thus different
kinds of affection, role modeling, and learning. Girls raised in such
environments can come to understand that having children need not
necessarily confine them, even temporarily, to an isolated life of
mothering.
Mothers can come to understand this too, of course, and thus
open up for themselves worlds in which they are less likely to
overinvest in their children at their own expense. Mothers who rely
on others to help them caretake tend to fare better emotionally, as
7. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, tit. III, 110 Stat. 2105, 2198-2260 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
8. See Ron Shouval et al., Anomalous Reactions to Social Pressure of Israeli and Soviet
Children Raised in Family Versus Collective Settings, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 477
(1975); see also URIE BRONFENBRENNER, Two WORLDS OF CHILDHOOD: U.S. AND U.S.S.R.
(1970) (describing the Soviet Union as utilizing a collective-centered system of childrearing).
9. See Caryl Rivers & Rosalind C. Barnett, Are Dual-Income Families Walking Time
Bombs?, CHI. TRIB., July 9, 1996, at 1-11.
10. See BEATRICE B. WHITING & JOHN W.M. WHITING, CHILDREN OF SIX CULTURES 106
(1975); Sarane Spence Boocock, Children in Contemporary Society, in RETHINKING
CHILDHOOD 414 (Arlene Skolnick ed., 1976); Jerome Kagan, The Child in the Family,
DAEDALUS, Spring 1977, at 33.
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they get older." Moreover, the more mothers consistently rely on
various different networks for caretaking, the less deviant are all
nontraditional caretaking arrangements. The more we denaturalize
the isolated nuclear family, the more freedom we give women to
leave abusive relationships, to parent without men if they choose, and
to nurture their own development even as they nurture their children.
Roberts's criticism of the current kinship foster care arrangement
does not explicitly or implicitly endorse the old AFDC system or a
primary caretaker norm, but as she calls for more state support of
caretaking in order to avoid the problems with the current kinship
foster care situation, it is important to keep in mind what we may
want and not want that support to look like. Certainly, there is
nothing wrong with providing all children, regardless of whether they
have foster status, with the same governmental services, like access to
medical insurance, housing assistance, mental health treatment, and
parental drug treatment. However, we may not want a cash
assistance program that extends only to parents or primary
caretakers. There may be advantages to systems that actively
encourage parents to share their childcare responsibilities with others
so that we can allow those parents to expand both their own and their
children's horizons. Childcare subsidies that go directly to childcare
providers, whether they are daycare centers or grandmothers and
aunts, might serve us just as well as cash allowances that go only to
parents.
II. FAMILY AUTONOMY
The main focus of Roberts's concern with the current state of
kinship foster care is not that it encourages kinship care over primary
parental care, but that it does so at the expense of family autonomy.12
By putting a child in a foster care placement -whether that
placement be with a family member or someone else-parent, child,
and extended family subject themselves to a kind of state scrutiny
that is forbidden in nuclear families that have not availed themselves
of state services. Roberts clearly condemns such interference and
suggests that the financial exigency that makes kinship foster care
11. See ROSALIND C. BARNET & CARYL RIVERS, SHE WORKS, HE WORKS: How Two-
INCOME FAMILIES ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF 27-34 (1996).
12. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 1632-33.
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necessary need not and should not deprive families of their ability to
raise children as they choose. 3
Roberts's analysis demands clarification of two separate but
important points. First, to suggest that the state should provide aid
for caretaking yet still defer to the autonomy of caretakers who
receive it requires a square rejection of the explicit reasoning in cases
like Wyman v. James14 and the implicit reasoning in cases like
Wisconsin v. Yoder. 5 Second, asking for state deference to kinship
units-not just parents-requires an articulation of a right to
autonomy that discards parental rights rhetoric and focuses instead
on other benefits that such state deference produces.
In Wyman, the Supreme Court held that state social workers
could visit the homes of AFDC recipients because of the "public[]
interest ... [in] ... protection and aid for the dependent child whose
family requires such aid for that child. The focus is on the child and,
further, it is on the child who is dependent.11 6 Lost on the Court was
the rather obvious point that all children are dependent. The
important question is: Dependent on whom? The Court ruled that if
a child's dependency needs are met in part by the state, then the
constitutional protection to be free from governmental searches into
the home evaporates because of the reasonableness of a search whose
purpose is "the welfare, not the prosecution, of the aid recipient for
whom the worker has profound responsibility."' 7  Comparably, in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court ruled that Amish parents' decision to
pull their children out of what had been mandatory school after
eighth grade was justifiable in part because the Amish community
"reject[ed] public welfare in any of its usual modern forms.' 18
Because Amish children's dependency needs are met without relying
on state assistance, Amish families are entitled to more deference.
There is strong reason to question just how seriously the Supreme
Court takes this proposition. Through its parens patraie authority, the
state has responsibility for all children, not just those receiving
"public welfare." Does an across-the-board $1000-per-child tax
deduction subject all people who take advantage of it to the kind of
state regulation that Ms. Wyman was forced to accept? One tends to
13. See id. at 1632-33.
14. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
15. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
16. 400 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 323.
18. 406 U.S. at 222.
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think not. Nonetheless, in calling for state deference to familial
decision making in kinship care arrangements and simultaneously
calling for more state subsidy for meeting children's dependency
needs, Roberts clearly calls for the rejection of the analysis that limits
freedom from government interference to those parents who forego
"public welfare."
What then is the justification for family autonomy? Why is it
important that the government refrain from interfering in family life?
Traditionally, the justification has been framed in terms of parental
rights. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court wrote that
parents have rights to "bring up [a] child in the way he should go."19
In Yoder, the Court wrote that the "primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is... established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition."20 In Smith v. OFFER, Justice Stewart
wrote:
If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family,
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interest, I should have little
doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on "the
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."
'21
These cases all root the right to be free from governmental
interference in the parents. To ask the state to defer to childrearing
decisions made by kinship care providers and other nonparents
requires an articulation of the virtues of such deference. Why should
the state defer to nonparents who want to make childrearing
decisions with which the state might disagree? Because both the
children and ultimately the state itself benefit from such
noninterference.
First, it may well be in children's interest to have the government
refrain from trying to guide or rear children. In a pluralistic society,
the government must be very careful and balanced in its transmission
of values. 22 That balanced treatment is often not what children most
need. As Stephen Gilles writes, "loving efforts to transmit.., values
help form ... children's characters, enable them to learn what it is to
19. 321 U.S. 158. 16A(1944)
20. 406 U.S. at 232.
21. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166).
22. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) ("[A]ffirmative sponsorship of particular
ethical, religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State not to attempt in a society
constitutionally committed to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice.").
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have a coherent way of life, and develop their capacity to enter into
caring, long-term relationships with others."23 Children benefit from
the value-laden educational process that usually accompanies the
familial socialization of children. A clear sense of what is right and
good helps children understand who they are. The state is clearly
limited in its ability to establish its own notion of what is right and
what is good. Children need the bias that the state is forbidden to
demonstrate.
Second, children benefit from a sense of family and community
that gives them both a sense of being special and a sense of belonging.
In possibly the most influential book in family law, Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child, the authors write: "Only a child who has at least
one person whom he can love, and who also feels loved, valued, and
wanted by that person, will develop a healthy self-esteem.
'24
Children need to feel a part of something unique. Too much
government interference with the child's upbringing makes the child
one of a million citizens, not part of a select group. For children, who
are inherently vulnerable and dependent, the benefits of feeling like
one who belongs to a particular group may far outweigh the benefits
of state interference. Moreover, as Martha Minow writes, "belonging
is essential to becoming. ' 25  Children cannot grow into moral
autonomy without a sense of connection to a family or a community.
26
As Peggy Cooper Davis points out: "For children, civil freedom
brings nothing less than the right to grow to moral autonomy, because
the child-citizen ... flowers to moral independence only under
authority that is flexible in ways that states ... cannot manage, and
temporary in ways that states ... cannot tolerate.
'27
Third, the government itself benefits from its own deference to
family autonomy because allowing children to grow into moral
autonomy leads to a diversity and pluralism that keep democracies
strong.28 Family autonomy fosters heterogeneity in a manner that
23. Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
937, 941 (1996).
24. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 20 (1973).
25. Martha Minow, Forming Underneath Everything That Grows: Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 WiS. L. REV. 819, 894.
26. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 12 (1989) ("If we ask ourselves what actually enables people to be
autonomous, the answer is not isolation, but relationships .... ).
27. Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107
HARV, L. REV. 1348, 1371-72 (1994).
28. See Gilles, supra note 23, at 960; see also Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of
Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH.
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ultimately serves a polity committed to various forms of individual
rights. It produces healthier citizens who are able to respect
difference even as they honor their own ethical beliefs.
Rooting the need for familial autonomy in something other than
parental rights does not necessarily dispense with the idea of parental
rights. There may be a variety of reasons why the state should defer
to parents more than other family members. Given their investment
in their children, parents may deserve such deference more than
others, and there may be advantages to a clear hierarchy of parental
rights.29 Thus, if there is an intrafamily conflict and no evidence of
parental unfitness, perhaps parents should enjoy the presumption that
they act in their children's best interests.30  But absent such
intrafamily conflict, there are sound reasons for the state to respect a
right to family autonomy that gives other family members a right to
that presumption. Such deference benefits the children and
ultimately the state in ways that should make us question the current
government practice of regulating kinship foster care.
CONCLUSION
As always, Dorothy Roberts has thoughtfully and poignantly
called our attention to the ways in which current law forces
disadvantaged people, particularly women of color, to endure
hardships that many others need not endure. In doing so, she
demonstrates the benefits of kinship care arrangements and the
limitations of the current regulation of kinship arrangements through
the foster care system. Her analysis raises important questions about
alternative childcare and state regulation. In particular, her
evaluation of the benefits of kinship care encourages us to consider
the extent to which we want governmental support for caretaking to
reinforce the primary caretaker norm. It also encourages us to
understand family autonomy, not just as a parental right, but as a
necessary part of a healthy, just, and rich polity.
E. V. 463,480-82 (1983).
29. See Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by
Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1541-43, 1548 (1998) (explaining why parents
benefit from state deference to their parenting decisions and why dispersing childrearing rights
too broadly can be harmful to children).
30. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (upholding the right of a mother to block
grandparent visitation that she felt was harmful to the children).
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